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Abstract 
 
This paper users demand conventional Engel Curve analysis as well as a double-
hurdle model to explore whether there are intrahousehold differentials in the 
allocation of education expenditure between boys and girls in rural Sri Lanka.  
Contrary to most developing countries there is a significant bias favouring girls for 
1990/91 and 1995/6 for age groups categories 8-9, 14-16 and 17-19 and in 2000 for 
age category 14-16 and 17-19.  Significant differences in enrolment favouring girls 
for age groups 17-19 explain part of the girl-bias observed in 1990/91 and 2000/01 
but most of the bias is driven by positive expenditure given enrolment.  The biases 
favouring girls are observed at critical stages of the schooling career in the run-up to 
key national exams. The 8-9 age group captures the run-up to the Year 5 scholarship 
exams that are used to gain entry to better performing secondary schools  The 14-16 
and 17-19 age groups capture those who read for important National level 
qualifications vital for the job market.  This paper also looks at various possible 
explanations for the bias.  
1. Introduction 
Developing countries have been a testing ground for the investigation of 
gender bias in the allocation of educational resources -mainly schooling expenditure- 
in a household (Burgess and Zhuang 2000, Rudd 1993, Kingdon 2005).  The rationale 
for the exercise is often found in the hypothesis that girls may be less favoured than 
boys (or even discriminated against) in terms of parents spending towards their 
education.  Often macro data lends support to this contention with female schooling 
rates being significantly less than those for men     
Sri Lanka is a particularly interesting case to look at in this regard.  This is 
because it is a developing country in South Asia well known for her high 
achievements in male and female literacy and gender 'equality' in terms of school 
enrolment and exam completion.  In recent years, however, this success seems to have 
translated into a very interesting phenomena:  School enrolment rates are higher for 
girls compared to boys especially at more senior grades in school-grades that run up 
to important national level examinations such as the Ordinary Levels (ages 14-16) and 
Advanced Levels (ages 17-19).  Table 1 shows that this gap in enrolment is 
significant throughout the 1990s, for the age 14-16 category.  It is interesting examine 
whether this gap observed at the aggregate level is reflected in household level 
investment in education and if there is a significant favouring of boys or girls at the 
margin, in terms of both enrolment and expenditure on education once enrolled.  
It is also interesting to attempt to explain why a household-level gender bias 
exists, if at all, in the allocation of education expenditure. Could it be due to gender 
differences in returns to schooling in the labour market?  Could it be indicative of an 
insidious form of ‘discrimination’ that happens in the labour market where girls have 
to be more educated than their counterparts in the opposite gender when competing 
for the same job?  Alternatively, could the answer lie outside the labour market 
reflecting perhaps differences in ‘cultural’ attitudes to the education of boys and girls? 
 This paper attempts, primarily, to establish whether there are gender 
differences in expenditure towards education in rural Sri Lanka over the decade 
beginning in the 1990s.  It is an issue that has not been investigated so far.  It also 
looks at some possible explanations for the results observed. I use both demand 
analysis (i.e., the conventional Engel Curve method) as well as a double-hurdle 
model.  The study uses 3 household income and expenditure surveys for 1990/91, 
1995/96 and 2000/01.   Section 2 discusses the Engel curve and double-hurdle 
models. Section 3 discusses the data and section 4 looks at the results and checks for 
robustness. Section 5 attempts to explain the results.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Intrahousehold Allocation of Education Expenditure 
2.1. Engel Framework 
 
 If individual level data was available, then we could directly compare 
expenditure on education for males and females.  However, given the lack of such 
individual level data, intrahousehold allocational differences have to be estimated 
indirectly.    Data is available at the level of the household and therefore I try to detect 
gender-biases in education expenditure by investigating how the presence of 
individuals of similar ages but opposite sexes affect household expenditure on 
education. The Working-Lesser Engel form for demand analysis is used with a linear 
relationship assumed between the share of the budget on each good and the log of 
total household expenditure.   Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p.75) argue that such a 
relationship has the theoretical advantage of being consistent with a utility function 
and conforms to data 'in a  wide range of circumstances'.  As discussed in Deaton 
(1997:231), Working's Engel curve can be extended to include household 
demographic composition  where age classes are denoted by nj and are broken down 
by gender. Separate γij coefficients can be calculated for males and females: 
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where wi is the share of the household budget devoted to the i
th
 good (education 
expenditure in this paper) calculated as pi qi /X with pi and qi denoting the price and 
quantity of good i (education) and x is total expenditure per household, n is household 
size, nj  is the number of people in age-sex class j (there are J such classes in total)
1
. 
 The age categories adopted for children are important because each of it is the 
run up to an important national exam that qualifies a student to enter the next stage 
and even make the choice of entering an institution that is reputed for better 
performance than the one which he or she leaves. The vector z contains other socio-
economic variables such as the education of the household head, ethnic group, 
location (district) dummies. Finally, ui is the error-term for good i (education).    The 
coefficient β determines whether the good is a luxury or a necessity.  If β > 0 then the 
good is a luxury with the budget share increasing with total outlay making the total 
expenditure elasticity greater than 1.  The good is a necessity if β < 0 with an 
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 The potential endogeneity of household expenditure per capita is checked for with the use of the 
instrumental variable approach. I use unearned income and its square as instruments.  Unearned income 
comprise dividends, interest and rents.  Roughly 13 per cent of the rural households in the HIES have 
some form of positive unearned income.  The instruments are relevant with an F test on the joint 
significance of the instruments in an equation predicting the potentially endogenous variable being 
significant at the 5 per cent level.  An over identification test asserts that the instruments are valid.  
However, the Hausman-Wu test performed fails to reject the erogeneity of the log of expenditure per 
capita for all years 1990/91, 1995/6 and 2000/01 and I have therefore retained this variable in the wage 
equation. 
expenditure elasticity less than 1.  Gender bias in the allocation of good i can be 
detected through a straight forward F test checking whether the coefficients γij = γik 
where j and k reflect boys and girls in the same age group. 
 The model is fitted, as is conventional, on the sample of all households with a 
child aged 0-19 years, regardless of whether the households incur a zero or positive 
budget share of a particular expenditure
2,3
.   
Kingdon (2005) argues that fitting one model to capture the school enrolment 
decision as well as the expenditure given enrolment decision may be one of the 
reasons as to why the conventional Engel curve analysis may fail to pick up a gender-
bias in schooling expenditure in India as in  Subramanian and Deaton (1991).  She 
argues that a gender-bias in schooling can work through both the above channels and 
that averaging across them may lead to the conclusion of no gender bias if the bias 
works through just one channel.  She therefore proposes a hurdle model that separates 
the households decision whether to incur any expenditure (i.e., enrol the child in 
school or not) from how much is actually spent given that it is decided to incur 
expenditure (i.e., expenditure given enrolment)  In her sample, zero purchases equate 
to the child not being sent to school while in nearly 98% percent of those sent to 
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 Another issue to consider is whether the Engel curve is indeed linear, as assumed, or if it is  non-
linear, with households considering education a luxury at lower levels of income and a necessity at 
higher levels of income.  In the regression  analysis, this would be reflected by the coefficient on the 
log of household expenditure being positive for the lower income groups and negative for the higher 
income groups when the analysis accounts for household socio-economic status.  This is not the case, 
as seen in results discussed later, education is a luxury across all income groups with an elasticity of 
1.02, 0.85, 0.88 and 0.67 in 1990 across the poorest to the richest quintile; 1.09, 1.08, 1.07 and 1.06 in 
1995 and an almost equal elasticity of 0.8 across all groups in 2000/01.  Even simple descriptive 
statistics (unreported) of the budget share of education expenditure by expenditure quartile show a 
positive correlation.  This is a sign that education is a luxury with the budget share devoted towards it 
increasing with income(expenditure). I therefore work with the assumption that the Engel curve is 
linear. 
3
 Note also that issues such as those raised in Jensen (2000) whether gender differences occur within or 
across households if girls tend to be in larger households due to parents ‘son preferring, differential 
stopping behaviour’ is not applicable in the Sri Lankan case.  Household size tends to be the same with 
larger households not being those with more girls than boys, in Sri Lanka, with no evidence to back a 
claim of son/daughter preferring behaviour. 
 
school (i.e., enrolled) incur some positive expenditure.  She therefore uses the terms 
positive expenditure and enrolment interchangeably.  Kingdon finds that the basic 
discriminatory mechanism is via differential enrolment rates for boys and girls.   
 A hurdle model, however, as discussed above, is inappropriate for the Sri 
Lankan case.   This is because enrolment in school does not necessarily mean that a 
positive expenditure is incurred on education.  Schooling in Sri Lanka in State schools 
(as do a majority of children in rural areas) has been largely ‘free’ since the 1930s.   
Text books and uniform material is provided free of charge by the government as well 
as a highly subsidised bus-pass scheme.  In some schools free midday meals were 
provided.  This means that around 25 per cent of our sample with a child enrolled in 
school do not report a positive education expenditure, during the period covered in the 
relevant question: The survey asks for expenditure on school books, stationary, fees, 
travelling etc. during the month before the survey and clothing expenditure (uniforms, 
tailoring) for the six months before the survey.   
 This means that in the Sri Lankan case, zero expenditure on education may 
reflect non-enrolment or that no expenditure is incurred even if the child is enrolled in 
school.    What is more appropriate for the Sri Lankan case is a double-hurdle model 
explained below. 
 
2.2. Double-hurdle Model 
The double-hurdle model proposed originally by Cragg(1971), assumes that a 
household makes two independent decisions regarding the purchase of an item, with 
each decision explained by a different set of explanatory variables.  A positive level 
of expenditure is observed only when two hurdles are crossed.  In our case the first 
hurdle is whether or not to enrol a child in school (a binary decision that can be 
estimated using a probit) and the second being incurring a positive expenditure given 
the decision to school (that can be modelled using a truncated regression).  Each 
decision process is modelled using a different latent variable, where the latent variable 
may or may not be observed.  For each household with a child in age group 1 to 19, 
 
  a  w*1   school enrolment decision  (2a) 
  b  w*2   expenditure decision   (2b) 
  b  w     if 0w*i1   and 0w
*
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0  w     otherwise 
 
where *1w  is a latent variable describing whether the household has a child enrolled in 
school or not, *2w  is a latent variable describing expenditure on education and w is the 
observed dependent variable (household budget share of education expenditure), a  a 
vector explaining the school enrolment decision and b  a vector explaining the school 
enrolment decision,   and   are the respective independent error terms distributed as 
)1,0(~ N  and )1,0(~ Nu .   
The double-hurdle model with independent error terms can be estimated by 
the following log-likelihood function (Moffatt, 2005; Aristei et al, 2007): 
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The first term reflects the contribution of all the zero observations.  Its shows zeros 
occurring due to non-enrolment )(1 ia , as well as those that might possibly occur 
even in the second stage decision 

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
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

b
.  The second term corresponds to the 
contribution of all the values indicating positive education expenditure
4
.   
 
Under the assumption of independence between the two error terms, the log-
likelihood function of the double-hurdle model is equivalent to the sum of the log-
likelihoods of a probit model and a truncated  regression model.  Thus maximising a 
probit over all observations followed by a regression on just the non-zero observations 
on the non-zero observations is equivalent to maximising the log likelihood of the 
double-hurdle model (McDowell 2003), since the likelihood function is separable
5
.  
To identify whether significant within household differentials exist in the 
allocation of education expenditure the coefficients on the demographic controls are 
compared using a F-test, as for the case of the conventional Engle Curve analysis,  
The most important thing about this analysis is that since the enrolment and 
expenditure decisions are now estimated separately, we can unpack the effects picked 
up by the Engel curve analysis and see whether the bias occurs in the enrolment or 
expenditure decision. 
 
3. Data   
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 Note that fitting a double-hurdle model is quite different to fitting a Tobit model on all the 
observations of wi.  .Fitting a  Tobit implies that the zero values come about as a corner solution, not as 
a part of a separate decision process that governs two different outcomes (decision to participate versus 
the level or intensity of participation).  The double hurdle model also differs from a Heckman selection 
model because it allows for the possibility of zero observations in the second stage.  Put differently, the 
log-likelihood function with independent error terms using the Heckman (1979) two-step method  is 
almost identical to (4) above, apart from  
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  in the first term that reflects the contribution of zero 
values occurring in the second stage.  
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 This paper adapts Julian Fennema’s user-written code in STATA available at 
http://www.sml.hw.ac.uk/sojaf/Stata/ for the estimation of the double-hurdle model. 
 The data comes from three cross-section Household Income and Expenditure 
Surveys (HIES) for 1990/91, 1995/6 and 2000/01 carried out by the Department of 
Census and Statistics (DCS), Sri Lanka.   The DCS conducts the HIES once every 5 
years.  Data collection is done in twelve equal monthly rounds to capture seasonal 
variations in income and expenditure. A two stage stratified random sample design is 
used with urban, rural and estate sectors as the domains for stratification. The primary 
sampling unit is a census block and the secondary sampling unit are the housing units 
within the selected census blocks. 
 The overall quality of the HIES is quite good with high response rates and a 
coverage that is consistent with other independent surveys carried out on the same 
population.  Let us discuss these two survey quality indicators separately.  The 
1990/91 and 1995/6 surveys have a 95 per cent response rate while the 2000/01 
survey has a 91 per cent response rate.  Non-response is due mainly to respondents 
being unable to complete the schedule, refusing to do so, being temporarily away or 
due to some unspecified 'other' reason. The incidence of non-response showed no 
significant seasonal variation--i.e., the amount of non-response was roughly the same 
during all 12 months of the year.   These response rates compare quite favourably 
with those of several other countries.  For example, six popular US government 
household surveys conducted during the 1990-1999 period indicate an initial response 
rate between 84 per cent to 95 per cent while UK's General household survey, which 
is also based on face-to-face interviews, records response rates averaging  80 per cent 
over the decade. 
 The coverage rate compares the estimated number of people from the HIES in 
a specific demographic group to the same estimate from an independent population 
total--usually Census estimates.  For example, the under 17 population by race and 
gender.  The DCS carried out an all-island Census in 1981 and 2001.  The HIES 
2000/01 results are consistent with the Census 2001 results in terms of demographic 
composition with the main limitation that the HIES excludes several areas in the 
North and East of the country, due data collection problems in these war-torn areas.  
The broad composition of the HIES is also similar to that of the Consumer Finance 
Survey carried out by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka during the 1990s.  The two 
surveys gather similar information and have roughly the same demographic and 
ethnic composition.   No groups are noticeably under or over-represented compared to 
the Consumer Finance Survey that also excludes areas in the North and East in their 
work.   
 Table 2 contains summary statistics for the variables used to estimate the 
education Engel curves and double-hurdle model for rural areas.  Education 
expenditure as a share of total expenditure for all households with at least one child 
aged 0 to 19 is not large at around 2 per cent in the 1990s, with the share growing, 
albeit slightly, over the decade.  In rupee terms, the average rural household education 
expenditure was around Rs. 50 in 1990 and Rs. 324 a month by the year 2000.  The 
rather small share of education expenditure is unsurprising because education is 
basically 'free' in Sri Lanka.  However, there is still a cost and specially an 
opportunity cost to education.  If a child attends a state school (as do a majority of 
children in rural areas), text books and uniform material as well as a mid-day meal in 
the case of a few schools was provided during the decade beginning in the 1990s.  
However costs of private tuition fees, exercise books, travelling, equipment and 
additional costs of uniforms (such as shoes, socks, etc.), a nominal school fee etc. was 
still to be borne by households.    The various categories of education expenditure 
have been aggregated and it is assumed that reparability is not an issue since the 
composition of various expenditure categories over time has remained roughly the 
same. 
 
4. Results   
4.1. Engel Curve estimations 
 Equation 1 is used to run OLS regressions for the budget share of education in 
rural areas for 1990/91, 1995/6 and 2000/01 (Table 3), for households with at least 
one child aged 0 to 19.   F-tests for the equality of γ coefficients are presented at the 
bottom of the table. 
    The goodness of fit of the linear Engel curve  is around 0.13 for all 3 years. The 
coefficients on log expenditure are positive and close to unity in some cases showing 
that education is treated as a luxury.  The elasticity is highest in 1995 at 1.1 when the 
country's poverty rates were the  highest during the decade at 33 per cent (see DCS 
2005).  The lower elasticity of 0.87 for 2000 suggests that education has become to be 
treated as less of a luxury towards the end of the decade with the country's economy 
picking up and poverty rates dropping to 25 per cent in rural areas
6
. 
 The coefficient on household size is significant and positive for all three years 
.  This matches theoretical arguments that suggest that larger households will be better 
off due to economies of scale that accrue from shared public goods, at any given level 
of per capita resources.  However, note also that household size may be endogenous 
because parents with a higher taste for schooling may choose to have smaller families 
and a higher education budget share.  Unfortunately we do not have data on 
                                                 
6
 Unfortunately no previous study exists for Sri Lanka pertaining to a similar analysis to compare these 
education expenditure elasticities.  Kingdon(2005)'s estimates for India for 1994 show that for most 
States the elasticity is close to or above unity.    Subramanian (1995) reports elasticities ranging 
between 1.3 and 2.75 for some of India's poorest States for the mid 1980s.  In comparison to these 
figures, Sri Lanka's rural sector seems to treat education as less of a luxury than most Indian States. 
 
households across time in order to capture household level fixed effects and so 
address the issue of the potential endogeneity of household size. 
 The education of the household head is also positively significant for all three 
years. This indicates a higher demand for schooling among households with more 
educated heads.  Ethnic group is also significant with being a Tamil household 
affecting the budget share negatively. 
 The most important result for this paper is to note the coefficients against the 
age-cohort variables and the F tests at the bottom of the table that compare these 
coefficients between boys and girls of the same age group  Compared to the omitted 
category of females aged 30 to  54, children  in age categories between 5 and 19 exert 
a significant positive impact on a household's budget share on education.  This is not 
surprising.  What  is particularly interesting to note, however, is that the coefficients 
are higher for girls than for boys for most age groups especially in 1990 and 1995.   In 
1990, for instance, if a child had been a girl rather than a boy in the 14-16 age group 
within the same household, 0.9 percent more would have been spent on her towards 
education, once controlled for other factors such as household size, etc. The 
corresponding figure for 1995 was 1.1 per cent.   Similarly, in 1990, adding an extra 
girl in the 17-19 age group increased the household education budget by 1.8 per cent 
more than adding a boy of the same age group.  The F-tests at the bottom of the table 
summarise these results by highlighting the significant biases.  In both 1990/91 and 
1995/6, statistically significant biases favouring girls are indicated for the age cohorts 
5 to 9, 14-16 and 17 to 19.  The Engel curve estimates do not indicate any significant 
biases for the year 2000/01.  
 
3.2. Double-hurdle Model 
 The results for the double-hurdle model estimations are presented in Table 4.  
For each year, a probit looking at participation (i.e., household has a child enrolled in 
school) and a truncated regression based on the level of expenditure is estimated.  At 
the bottom of the table, F-statistics and their significance are reported for the 
comparison of coefficients between boys and girls in the various age categories. 
For 1990/91, the F-statistics for the participation equation shows that 
significant differences between girls and boys are found in terms of school enrolment 
for the 17-19 category, favouring girls.  This matches the school enrolment statistics 
presented in Table 1, where it was clear that 9 per cent more girls in that age group 
are enrolled at school than boys
7
.  The F-tests for the expenditure results show that for 
age-groups 5-9, 14-16 and 17-19, adding an extra girl rather than a boy increases 
household education expenses significantly.  Thus the results in the Engel curve 
analysis in the previous section seem to be driven mainly by education expenditure 
once children are enrolled in school.  The same holds for the year 1995/6.  For the 
year 2000, the double-hurdle model picks up biases in the enrolment decision for age 
category 17-19 and expenditure decision for age category 14-16, both favouring girls.  
This was not picked up in the Engel curve analysis.  This is most probably because 
the two channels through which ‘discrimination’ works  (enrolment and expenditure 
given enrolment) cancel each other out, when aggregated under the conventional 
Engel curve method or are weakly significant on their own (as in the case of the girl 
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 Table 1 was based on individual-level data.  The estimations in Table 4 are based on household level 
data.  The F-statistics tell us that adding an extra girl in a household in the age group 17-19 means that 
there is a significantly higher chance that she will be enrolled in school than adding an extra boy.  The 
household-level estimations do not show a significant difference in the enrolment  rates of boys and 
girls in the 14-16 age category.  This may maybe because the control variables in the regression explain 
all of this difference or because household level aggregation of enrolment (and indeed education 
expenditure) under-estimates the true bias.  Unfortunately we do not have individual level data on 
education expenditure to test this hypothesis. 
bias in the expenditure for 14-16 year olds in 2000 that is exactly significant at the 10 
per cent level), which cancels out when combined with the enrolment decision.   
 
Robustness Checks 
    As a robustness check, I re-run the estimations for households with only boys or 
girls (with the observations pooled) to see if the results are similar to that of pooling 
all households together.  Around 20 per cent of the households  have only boys and 20 
per cent only girls.  Descriptive statistics for these two groups show that their mean 
values for budget share of education expenditure, household expenditure, household 
size and siblings are statistically the same, as the  t-value  testing the means to be 
different is rejected in all cases.   The regression analysis for this sub-sample of 
households indicate results that match that of all households.  In other words,  age 
categories 5-9, 14-16 and 17-19 still indicate a significant girl bias, as the F-tests 
reveal (results unreported). 
    Do the baseline results of a significant bias favouring girls in 1990/1 and 1995/6 
result hold across expenditure groups or is it something that it driven by the poor (non 
poor)?   For all three years, the budget share of education increases as the household 
group becomes richer.  For example, in 1990, the poorest quartile spend 1.47 of their 
budget share on education, the second poorest 1.5, the third poorest 1.5 and the richest 
1.9.  In 1995 the corresponding shares are 1.34, 1.43, 1.66 and 2.25.  In 2000 it is 
1.55, 1.81, 1.93 and 2.22.  Household size decreases by expenditure group.  None of 
the other regressors vary notably between income quartiles.  To see if baseline results 
hold across expenditure groups, I interact the age cohort variable with a dummy 
indicating whether the household belongs to the poorest quartile and re-regress the  
education Engel curve.  I then interact the age cohort variable with a dummy 
indicating whether the household belongs to the richest quartile. The results of the F-
test for this exercise (unreported)  match those of the baseline case.   The bias in the 
5-9 category is indicated in the two middle-income groups.  In 1995 girls in the 14 to 
16 age group among the poorest quartile were favoured at a 1 per cent level of 
significance while it was around 12 per cent for the richest quartile.  The age group 
where the bias arises varies with the income group but what is common is that the 
biases always favour the girls. 
 Let us now discuss the findings regarding a girl-bias, for the 'baseline' results 
in more detail. 
 Each of the age cohorts 5 to 9, 14 to 16 and 17-19 run up to and culminate at 
important State examinations.  The age cohort 5 to 9 culminates in the Grade 4 
scholarship exams, a competitive national exam, the results of which can be used to 
gain entrance to better-performing secondary schools.  The age group 14-16 is the 
senior secondary level ending with the Ordinary Level (O/L) examinations.  It is an 
important educational milestone that completes secondary education and is needed to 
gain entrance to better performing schools and  to qualify for high-school education. 
High school education is captured by age group 17-19 that culminates with students 
reading for the Advanced Level (A/L) examinations qualifying them to enter 
university
8
. 
    In order to support the argument that the differential expenditure favouring girls is 
observed mainly in the run-up to key state exams, I split the age groups much more 
narrowly and use age in years rather than age group (i.e., age 5, 6, 7 and so on until 
19, together with other groups such as 0 to 4, 20-29, 30-54 and over 55 with females 
aged 30 to 54 omitted) and re-estimate the baseline regression.  I report just the F-tests 
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 Note that there is no grade repetition in Sri Lankan state schools. 
of the comparison of coefficients for boys and girls in Table 5.  The results provide 
strong support for the baseline results.  In 1990/91 a difference in expenditure (driven 
mainly by expenditure once enrolled) is observed at ages 8, 9, 18 and 19 (with the 
difference in age groups 15 and 16 high and significant at the 13 per cent), in 1995/6 
at ages 8, 9 and 16 and in 2000/01 at ages 15 and 18.  In 2000/01, the participation 
equation also indicates a significant difference favouring girls at age 17, implying that 
boys tend to drop out more from school at this age, just after their O/Ls, instead of 
choosing to read for the A/Ls
9
.  No differences are seen at the other ages. 
 Thus the results show that according the Engel curve methodology, rural 
households allocate the extra rupee towards daughters at age cohort 5-9 (primary 
school, especially as the children are aged 8 and 9), 14-16 (Ordinary levels) and 17-19 
(A/Ls) in 1990/91 and 1995/6.  A bias is also seen during in the 14-16 and 17-18 
category for 2000/01.  Higher investment at the primary school level may mean 
daughters can gain entry to better performing secondary schools.  Higher investment 
at the senior secondary and high-school level will, most probably, bring about better 
performance at the State examinations.    
    So why does an extra girl increase the household education budget more than a boy 
does?   
 
5. Explaining the bias 
Is it simply noise in the data?  
   It could be noise in the data that gives us these results.  We have, however, noted in 
the discussion in section 2.2 that the overall quality of the data is quite good as judged 
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 I have chosen to use results for groupings 5-9, 10-13, 14-16 and 17-19 as the baseline rather than the 
using age at levels because I think they better capture the ‘run-up’ to state exams, especially at more 
senior levels.  For example, the O/L curriculum for the exams at age 16 begin from age 14/15, while 
the A/L curriculum spans roughly 2.5 years from ages 17 to 19.   
by the coverage rate and non-response rate and the care with which it has been 
gathered and cleaned.   Moreover, the results are not sensitive to the way we break up 
the age-cohorts.   The results remain robust even when the age-composition of 
children is changed in order to make sure that the regression outcomes are not due to 
simply to the way I split the age categories up.    For example, the age categories were 
changed to (a) 5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 and (b) 5-14, 15-19 and yet again as (c) 5-9, 10-
16 and 17-19.  For both 1990/91 and 1995/96 it was (a) 5-9, 15-19 (c)5-9, 10-16 and 
17/19 with the most significant ages being 8/9, 15/16 and 18/19.  Thus it is not noisy 
data that explains our results.  It seems that the addition of a girl child in certain age-
cohorts genuinely increased the household education budget share more than adding a 
boy of the same age group.   
 
Is it just a matter of taste? 
    In order to get a better understanding of what component of education expenditure 
actually causes the bias, I disaggregate education expenditure into expenditure on 
books, fees, travelling and other expenses, and calculate the budget share of each of 
these components.  I then replace the left-hand-side of equation (1), i.e., wi with each 
of these budget shares separately and re-estimate (1) and carry the F test to check 
whether the gender bias is more obvious in any one component of education 
expenditure.  The unambiguous result is that in it is expenditure towards school books 
that cause a significant bias.  Expenditure in other categories such as fees are often 
higher for girls than boys but is not statistically significant. Is this indicative that there 
is no ‘favouring’ that happens but that it is simply a matter of ‘taste’ with girls 
preferring more books and input to education?  If this is the case, it seems strange that 
this ‘taste’ is not something found in every age group and that this taste is not 
consistent across the years.  Further, acohort-based analysis (i.e., splitting the age 
group as 0-5, 5-10, 10-15 and 15-20) shows that the ‘taste’ factor does not move 
along with the cohort—the significant biases appear only when girls reach a particular 
age category. 
 The above disaggregated analysis also shows that the girl bias is not due to 
girls being more ‘expensive’ in that parents are more keen to send them to school 
using safer modes of transport or that their uniforms cost more.  It is school books 
(supplementary text books, equipment and exercise books) that cause the most 
significant difference between boys and girls even though expenditure other 
categories also differ between boys and girls, favouring girls. 
 
Is there a ‘cultural’ preference for girls? 
 It is possible that the bias we notice favouring girls is a reflection of a wider 
‘cultural’ attitude or preference for girls.  This argument, however, can easily be 
refuted statistically but looking at similar analysis conducted with reference health 
expenditure or education expenditure in urban areas.  The girl bias does not occur in 
Engel curves estimated for food and health shares separately (unreported). The bias 
exists only in terms of education expenditure.  Notice also, that this expenditure bias 
is found only in the rural sector data.  We do not find such biases for urban areas.  So 
it seems that in rural areas, there is indeed a bias favouring girls in terms of education 
expenditure. 
 
Education is a substitute for the ‘dowry’ at marriage, so parents chose to invest in 
education rather than the dowry 
 Perhaps the girl-bias arises because education and subsequent employment are 
used by parents as a substitute for the dowry at the time of a daughter’s marriage.  
Dowries at marriage is still considered important by  some Sri Lankan parents and 
youth- roughly 30 percent according to a survey of Sri Lankan youth by Malhotra and 
Tsui (1996).  The trend of education and consequent earning potential being a 
substitute for the dowry is seen in South India as well, where higher education is often 
a dowry substitute and a means of improving a women's value in the marriage market.  
In some cases, dowries are often collected by the girl herself through employment as 
the age at marriage is pushed forwards
10
.   However, in Sri Lanka, the age of marriage 
being pushed forwards is not indicative that it is purely for the sake of collecting a 
dowry. The higher age at first marriage in Sri Lanka seems to be driven by poor, 
rather than improved economic and political conditions  (Caldwell et al 1989). For 
most females, employment before marriage is more for the income it provides, than 
purely for the dowry they can collect through 'saving' or the career they can build as a 
substitute for the dowry.   
 Female earnings, or rather, the earnings of both the man and the woman in the 
family has grown important over time due to slow economic growth and political 
unrest and thus, economic returns to education play an important role when a 
household decides to invest in a girl-child, rather than dowry or other 'cultural' or 
normative concerns.     A majority of Sri Lankan women participate actively in the 
labour market and are not considered a burden. In 1995 and 2000, labour force 
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 The median age at first marriage in Sri Lanka, for women in rural areas, has risen from around 20 in 
the 1960s to 25-27 in 2000 in rural areas (DHS 2000; Dissanayake 2000). Sri Lanka has historically 
had ages at first marriage that are higher than those of the rest of the region.  For example, while her 
counterparts married on reaching puberty at ages as young as 13 or 14 in Northern India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, the Sri Lankan female has been marrying at around 18 or 19 even during as far back as the 
1940s.  During the last couple of decades, these median ages have increased further, matching other 
Asian countries such as Taiwan or Thailand, as have educational levels and social welfare for women 
(De Silva 1990, Thornton and Lin 1994). 
 
participation of women was around 40 per cent (with this being higher for younger 
women) while for men it was around 80 per cent.  Moreover, unlike in neighbouring 
countries such as India or Bangladesh, a woman often does not move in with her in-
laws after marriage nor do her earnings after marriage accrue mainly to the family of 
her in-laws (Malhotra and Tsui 1996).  This means that her natal family can benefit as 
much from a daughters economic returns after marriage as they could a son’s.  An 
implication of this is that parents do not necessarily choose to invest more in sons 
under the implicit assumption that it will be sons who will look after them financially 
in old age rather than daughters.    
 The reason for the observed bias, therefore, cannot be explained convincingly 
by noise in the data, tastes, cultural attitudes or preferences or arguments regarding 
the dowry.  We shall now move to looking at the labour market for possible 
explanations. 
 
Are households responding to labour market returns being higher for women? 
The girl-bias may be due to returns to education being higher for girls than 
boys backed by the fact that the opportunity cost of leaving school was higher for a 
girl than a boy, given higher youth unemployment rates among girls with longer 
waiting periods (Salih 2001). 
Several studies done using Sri Lankan data for 1980/81, 1985 and 1990 
(Gutkind (1984), Glewwe (1985), Sahn and Alderman (1988), Aturupane (1993), 
Gunawardane (2002))  suggest that returns to female education is higher than that for 
males those completing secondary education (Ordinary Levels) or higher.   In rural 
areas, returns are particularly high for completing Ordinary Level and Advanced 
Level examinations
11
.   This means that if a girl stays on at school for an extra year at 
the secondary level or stays on to complete her education at the high-school level 
(A/Ls), the extra amount that she earns is higher than that for a boy.  
Did higher returns to education for girls persist into the 1990s?  If it did, the 
household level girl-bias may be seen to be an efficient allocation of resources and the 
decision itself may probably be a response to market outcomes in an economy, where 
females are economically active, assuming that a household's decision to invest in 
their children's education is guided by returns to education for adults at any given 
time. 
In order to verify what happens in the 1990s, I estimate Mincerian wage 
functions for males and females by level of education for  1995 and 2000.  I estimate 
returns to schooling in two ways.  First using earnings as the dependent variable (i.e., 
including both wage earners and non-wage earners) and correcting the estimates for 
sample selection of females and secondly, a fixed effects estimation by fine-tuning the 
Mincerian function to account for household level unobserved heterogeneity 
following Behrman and Wolfe (1984), Khandker (1990), Behrman and Deolalikar 
(1993, 1995), Gunawardane (2002)).    
 I correct for sample selection indirectly through correcting for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the household level by using the fixed effects estimation to a cluster 
sample, where the well-defined cluster in this case is the household in each cross-
section data set.  I use deviations from household means for all households where 
there are two or more males (females) who are wage earners, to investigate whether 
fixed effects are important, assuming that differences are across households (if they 
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 Most of these works use the Mincerian earnings or wage function and some (i.e.,Aturupane, Sahn 
and Alderman) correct the estimates for selectivity using the Heckman procedure to find that returns 
for females for secondary and A/L qualifications are higher than those for males and the direction of 
the effects remain unchanged when corrected for sample selection.  The trends remain the same 
whether one uses earnings or wages as the dependent variable. 
exist). If there are such unobservable fixed effects, and they are significant, the 
constant term of the fixed effects regression would be significant and the OLS 
estimations would be biased.  Controlling for 'fixed effects' at the household level 
controls for the sample selection problem as observed by Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990), 
Heckman and McCurdy (1980).  This is because the household-level observed 
variables used to control for selectivity in the paid labour force are those such as 
wealth, unearned income, assets etc., and controlling for household fixed effects 
should control for the selectivity in the paid labour force (Behrman and Deolalikar 
1995:106).  Apart from this, the fixed effects method addresses the issue of omitted 
variable bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity at the household and community 
level.  However, this procedure only addresses the issue of heterogeneity bias arising 
from unmeasured attributes that are common to individuals in the same household, 
since the fixed effects estimation is limited to households that have more than one 
male or female earning.   
 If the unobserved household and community effects are random instead of 
being fixed, they would bias the error term and invalidate standard statistical tests.  In 
order to test for this possibility, I estimate a random effects model using the same sub-
sample.  I then use the Hausman test to compare between the fixed or random effects 
estimations.  
 The data sources for both the earnings and wage functions are the same as for 
the previous analysis on intrahousehold allocation.   
 Due to space considerations, I have not reported the regression results, but 
calculated the returns to education on schooling for both the earnings and wage 
estimations.  The trends in private rates of return to education estimated using both 
the above methods (returns to education with earnings as the dependent variable 
corrected for sample selection and returns to education with wages as the dependent 
variable, corrected for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level using fixed 
effects) are very similar. 
 Table 6 reports fixed effects estimation based returns to education calculated, 
using the reported results for rural areas and unreported results for all areas
12
.  The 
table shows the extra return to an extra level of schooling. The results show that 
women have an unambiguously higher return to secondary and O/L education than do 
men in terms of both rural areas and all-sectors.   This matches trends observed in the 
1980s and 1990, reported by Aturupane, Gunawardane and other studies. The trends 
in all the estimations, regardless of econometric refinement and differences in the 
dependent variables, are broadly the same.  Note also that the higher returns seem to 
be concentrated at the lower levels of education especially in 1995.  Overall, the size 
of the return has fallen over the two decades beginning in 1981.  This is partly 
because the earlier estimates are 'inflated' in not accounting for household level 
heterogeneity, and partly, because true returns have indeed fallen, at least from 1985 
onwards when the estimates discussed become more comparable in terms of 
methodology adopted.   
 The calculations in this paper show, in addition, that the clear advantage 
females had in terms of returns in the 1980s and even 1995, diminishes slightly 
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 For the wage-based estimations the Breusch -Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test on the random effects 
model in all the cases show that unobserved household effects are indeed significant.  The Hausman 
test, used to compare the fixed and random effects models, rejects the null hypothesis that the 
difference in coefficients is not systematic in all cases at a 1 per cent level of significance apart from 
females in 1995, where it is rejected at the 10 per cent level of significance.  Assuming that the 
specification of the model is correct,  I interpret this result to mean that unobserved household effects 
and the implicit correction for selection is indeed important, and that the fixed effects estimations are 
superior to the OLS or random effects estimations.  I therefore use only the fixed effects-based 
estimations for the wage-based regressions.  Note, however, that the earnings-based results corrected 
for sample-selection also reveal the same type of trend in terms of returns to education.   
 
especially for rural areas by the year 2000.   Secondary school educated women still 
have an advantage but the male-female gap has fallen.
13,14
.    
Thus in spite of returns for females continuing to be higher than for males, the 
analysis as it stands does not seem to support the hypothesis that the household level 
female bias of education expenditure is clearly a response higher returns.  First, higher 
returns are observed in both rural and urban areas but gender based education 
expenditure differences are observed only for rural areas.  Moreover, the higher 
returns seem to be strongest at lower levels of schooling.  As such, the challenge of 
explaining gender differences in schooling in rural areas remains.  
 
Is it actually discrimination in the labour market? 
 The data shows that for all three years 1990/91, 1995/6 and 2000/01, women 
are significantly more educated than men, for every occupation category apart from 
for clerical work in government service (see Table 7, where summary information for 
the year 2000 are presented).    This can mean two things:  First, that women are 
actually discriminated  in the labour market with employers expecting women to be 
more qualified than men for the same  job.  Alternatively, that females have a higher 
taste for education and are therefore on average more educated than males, and this is 
reflected in the labour market—the latter argument, however leaves a puzzle behind: 
if women were more educated than men due simply to personal taste, then employers 
should prefer to employ more women rather than men assuming that education level 
is indicative of ability and productivity, and that both male and female education is 
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 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss why the returns have changed as they have between 
1995 and 2000, and indeed why returns overall have been going down since 1981.  Suffice it to note 
that there have been many exogenous shocks the economy faced during the post-liberalisation period.   
14
 It is possible that returns to schooling and schooling attainment are determined simultaneously, 
which is not addressed in this paper.   
 
valued equally in the labour market.  The fact that more females tend to be 
unemployed than men—specially amongst the youth—along with the fact that more 
men are employed that women (as a proportion of those of each gender participating 
in the labour market) seems to suggest just the opposite.  Being male seems to have 
some extra advantage attached to it than being female.  Both these contentions need to 
be investigated more fully. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper showed that contrary to most developing countries, there is a bias 
favouring girls in rural Sri Lanka in the allocation of education expenditure within the 
household.  This was seen using demand analysis assuming a linear Engel curve as 
well as a double-hurdle model that unpacks the enrolment and expenditure given 
enrolment decisions allowing for the fact that a household can report zero expenditure 
even when a child is enrolled in school due mostly to infrequency of purchase of 
items under the education category.    
Sri Lankan rural households seem to be allocating more educational resources 
towards girls in 1990/91 and 1995/6 for age groups 5-9, 14-16 and 17-19 and in 2000 
for age groups 14-16 and 17-19. This is driven mainly by the expenditure on girls 
versus boys given a household decides to spend on education.  In 1990/91 and 
2000/01 the double-hurdle model also showed that there was a bias towards enrolling 
more girls in school to read for their Advanced Levels (age group 17-19).    
The age groups where the biases are obvious both in the enrolment and 
expenditure equations are important: The significant differentials in age group 5 to 9 
happen at ages 8 and 9, corresponding to the run up to year 5 scholarship exams 
where children can gain entry into better performing state schools.  The 14-16 age 
group captures the culmination of secondary education with the reading for the 
Ordinary Level examination and gaining entrance to read particular subjects for the 
Advanced Levels.  The 17-19 age group captures the run up to and culmination in 
Advanced Level examination, by far the most competitive exam in Sri Lanka that 
allows a student to gain university entrance.  The fact that biases are all observed for 
these age groups and not for the 10 to 13 age group for instance or for the ages that 
fall outside 8/9, 14/15/16 or 18/19 in the robustness checks that split-up the age 
categories in different ways (as well as various us checks for robustness) show that 
the observed biases in expenditure are not random.  Rural households seems to be 
indicating a deliberate preference for spending more on education when an extra girl 
is added to the household rather than a boy close to important national-level 
examinations.   
 The paper then went onto explore various non-labour market and labour 
market oriented explanations that are possible for this observed bias.  Cultural biases 
favouring girls were ruled out as no bias was found in terms of food or health share 
expenditure or education expenditure for non-rural areas.  Arguments based on 
education being a possible substitute for the dowry were also considered and argued 
to be weak.  Several other taste and attitude based explanations were also looked at.  I 
also looked at labour market returns to education between males and females.  
Returns continue to be higher for females in the Sri Lankan labour market continuing 
trends in the early 1980s, even though the gap between males and females is reducing 
in recent years.  The higher returns would make it more efficient for a household to 
invest in an extra year of education for a girl rather than a boy, at the margin.  
However, we cannot conclude that this explains household-level gender differences in 
education expenditure because higher returns are observed both in rural and urban 
areas, strongest at lower levels of education. Another possible explanation is that there 
is an insidious form of discrimination of females going on in the Sri Lankan labour 
market, with females having to be more educated that their male counterparts in order 
to compete for the same job.  All these explanations contribute perhaps in varying 
degrees to the female-bias in household expenditure observed in rural Sri Lanka and 
need further investigation. 
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Table 1:  School Enrolment Rates by Gender in Rural Areas
1 
 1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 
Males 5-9 years n/a n/a n/a 
Females  5-9 years n/a n/a n/a 
  GAP    
    
Males 10-13 years 94.6 95.7 94.7 
Females 10-13 years 95.2 96.8 95.6 
 GAP (0.6) (1.1) (0.9) 
    
Males 14-16 years 78.3 84.8 86.1 
Females 14-16 years 83.2 87.4 88.3 
  GAP (4.9)*** (2.6)** (1.85)* 
    
Males 17-19 years 42.1 46.5 46.3 
Females 17-19 years (n=) 51.1 48.9 49.0 
  GAP (9.0)*** (2.4) (2.7) 
Note:  Boys (girls) enrolled as a percentage of all boys (girls) in that age cohort.  For age group 5-9, enrolment 
information is not available.  Enrolment information is extracted from the question that asks each member of the 
household what their usual activity is.  Unfortunately the question is asked only for persons 10 years and over.  
Positive household education expenditure is not a good proxy for enrolment as children can be enrolled in school 
but the household may not have incurred any positive expenditure on education during the reference period 
(roughly 20 per cent of the sample for children over 10).  Other sources indicate, however, that primary school 
enrolment rates in Sri Lanka are quite high at over 97% for both boys and girls during 1990-2000 (UNICEF). 
Source: Own calculations using HIES 1990/91, 1995/6 and 2000/01. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Budget Share of Education and Contributory variables 
Variable 
name 
Description of variable 1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 
Educ_share Budget share of education:  household education 
expenditure/Total expenditure on food and non-food items X 100 
1.84 
(0.04) 
2.11 
(0.05) 
2.56 
(0.08) 
Exp_TOT Total expenditure (in rupees) on food and non-food items per 
member of the household 
791.03 
(9.96) 
1303.36 
(22.23) 
2808.4 
(49.12) 
hsize household size 5.41 4.96 4.59 
M0_4 males aged 0 to 4 as a proportion of all household members  .04 .04 .04 
f0_4 females aged 0 to 4 as a proportion of all household members( .04 .04 .03 
M5_9 males aged 5 to 9 as a proportion of all household members  .05 .03 .04 
f5_9 females aged 5 to 9 as a proportion of all household members .05 .04 .03 
M10_13 males aged 10 to 13 as a proportion of all household members .05 .04 .03 
f10_13 females aged 10-13 as a proportion of all household members .05 .04 .03 
M14_16 males aged 14-16 as a proportion of all household members  .03 .03 .03 
f14_16 females aged 14-16 as a proportion of all household members  .03 .03 .03 
M17_19 males aged 17-19 as a proportion of all household members .03 .03 .03 
f17_19 females aged 17-19 as a proportion of all household members .03 .03 .03 
M20_29 males aged 20-29 as a proportion of all household members .06 .08 .07 
f20_29 females aged 20-29 as a proportion of all household members  .07 .08 .08 
M30_54 males aged 30-54 as a proportion of all household members .14 .16 .16 
f30_54** females aged 30-54 as a proportion of all household members .14 .16 .17 
M55 males above age 55 as a proportion of all excluding boarders and 
lodges) 
.05 .05 .06 
f55 females above age 55 as a proportion of all household members 
(excluding boarders and lodges) 
.04 .04 .04 
hhead_educ Education level (in years) of the household head 6.15 7.20 8.72 
Tamil Ethnicity of the household head is Tamil  .01 .04 .02 
Minority Ethnicity of the household head is Muslim, burgers or other .04 .04 .09 
Dependents 
(double 
hurdle model) 
Members in the family who are unable to work, unemployed or 
engaged in household work and stay at home as a proportion of 
all household  
0.25 0.24 0.25 
observations  9103 11597 9689 
Note: ** Reference group for education Engel-curve estimations.  Standard errors in parenthesis for continuous variables.  
Table 3:  Engel curves for education expenditure 
Dependent Variable: Budget share of education 
 1990/91 1995/6 2000/01 
Log expenditure 0.988 1.103 0.879 
 (13.30)** (16.07)** (13.75)** 
Log household size 0.722 0.765 1.094 
 (7.52)** (8.28)** (9.02)** 
M0_4 -2.554 -2.943 -3.002 
 (5.93)** (7.16)** (6.79)** 
f0_4 -2.384 -2.705 -2.838 
 (5.45)** (6.63)** (6.36)** 
M5_9 0.312 0.453 1.194 
 (0.73) (1.13) (2.76)** 
f5_9 1.126 1.203 1.029 
 (2.64)** (2.95)** (2.35)* 
M10_13 1.937 2.075 3.092 
 (4.33)** (4.98)** (6.85)** 
f10_13 2.331 2.633 2.485 
 (5.22)** (6.14)** (5.55)** 
M14_16 2.420 2.535 3.168 
 (4.95)** (5.60)** (6.42)** 
F14_16 3.317 3.639 4.085 
 (6.51)** (8.11)** (8.00)** 
M17_19 0.975 1.110 3.036 
 (1.95) (2.42)* (6.26)** 
F17_19 2.717 1.907 2.561 
 (5.56)** (4.21)** (5.25)** 
M20_29 -1.720 -1.991 -3.200 
 (4.31)** (5.51)** (7.74)** 
F20_29 -0.457 -0.356 -1.225 
 (1.35) (1.12) (3.42)** 
M30_54 -1.304 -1.486 -2.236 
 (3.05)** (3.92)** (5.26)** 
M55 -0.994 -1.535 -2.011 
 (2.19)* (3.66)** (3.89)** 
F55 -0.808 -0.464 -1.855 
 (2.12)* (1.31) (4.31)** 
hhead_educ 0.103 0.123 0.038 
 (11.27)** (13.85)** (4.25)** 
Tamil -0.603 -0.634 -0.495 
 (2.18)* (4.20)** (2.18)* 
Minority -0.310 -0.252 -0.186 
 (1.96)* (1.54) (1.16) 
Constant -6.408 -7.111 -6.209 
 (10.23)** (11.41)** (10.75)** 
Observations 9103 11597 9689 
r-squared 0.13 0.13 0.12 
F-Tests: 5-9 4.23(0.039)** 3.52(0.060)* 0.21(0.731) 
              10-13 0.88(0.347) 1.80(0.179) 1.45(0.228) 
              14-16 3.14(0.076)** 5.70(0.017) 2.41(0.121) 
              17-19 12.1(0.000)*** 2.72(0.098) 0.72(0.396) 
Note:  F-Tests refer to a testing for the equality of coefficients of, for example, m5_9 and f5_9, with the 
corresponding F-statistic and significance reported within brackets. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; 
District dummies included in regressions but not reported. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Table 4:  Double hurdle model estimations for education expenditure 
Dependent Variable: Budget share of education 
 1990/91 1995/6 2000/01 
 Participation 
Equation  
Expenditure 
Equation 
Participation 
Equation 
Expenditure 
Equation 
Participation 
Equation 
Expenditure 
Equation 
Log 
expenditure 
0.272 1.635 0.287 2.062 0.376 1.362 
 (2.03)* (13.83)** (3.02)** (16.85)** (5.18)** (12.87)** 
Log house-
hold size 
1.062 1.197 0.761 1.422 0.865 1.828 
 (5.60)** (6.65)** (5.83)** (7.35)** (5.97)** (8.36)** 
M0_4 -2.109 -4.673 -2.560 -5.446 -0.520 -6.302 
 (3.64)** (5.57)** (4.97)** (6.02)** (1.26) (6.98)** 
F0_4 -2.673 -4.544 -2.678 -5.466 0.716 -6.910 
 (4.34)** (5.35)** (5.25)** (5.94)** (1.61) (7.65)** 
M5_9 37.633 -1.286 27.625 -1.341 18.878 -1.387 
 (0.05) (1.78) (0.69) (1.76) (2.80)** (1.84) 
F5_9 32.801 -0.198 16.785 0.126 36.655 -1.744 
 (0.18) (0.27) (2.13)* (0.16) (0.15) (2.30)* 
M10_13 26.915 1.296 41.417 1.685 11.642 1.103 
 (0.53) (1.74) (0.05) (2.16)* (5.56)** (1.45) 
F10_13 40.288 1.820 14.970 2.387 20.312 0.420 
 (0.06) (2.46)* (2.22)* (3.00)** (1.27) (0.56) 
M14_16 7.715 0.789 7.902 1.226 8.195 0.202 
 (3.60)** (0.96) (4.72)** (1.45) (6.41)** (0.24) 
F14_16 9.178 2.123 9.261 2.759 9.866 1.591 
 (3.79)** (2.54)* (3.96)** (3.34)** (6.85)** (1.91) 
M17_19 2.762 -0.392 1.260 0.700 1.892 3.163 
 (3.34)** (0.45) (2.17)* (0.76) (4.58)** (3.44)** 
F17_19 1.423 3.765 0.960 2.444 2.698 1.793 
 (2.18)* (4.16)** (1.85) (2.62)** (5.80)** (1.84) 
M20_29 -0.267 -3.761 -1.107 -4.702 0.240 -7.178 
 (0.52) (5.07)** (2.69)** (5.79)** (0.63) (8.48)** 
F20_29 1.054 -1.740 0.157 -1.309 0.422 -3.325 
 (2.32)* (2.91)** (0.43) (2.01)* (1.26) (4.97)** 
M30_54 0.329 -2.642 -0.928 -2.955 0.863 -4.864 
 (0.62) (3.41)** (2.08)* (3.80)** (2.02)* (6.33)** 
M55 0.474 -2.354 -0.874 -2.994 0.218 -3.221 
 (0.75) (2.65)** (1.82) (3.19)** (0.47) (3.45)** 
F55 0.772 -2.306 -0.482 -0.183 -0.047 -3.219 
 (1.52) (3.21)** (1.22) (0.24) (0.12) (4.10)** 
hhead_educ 0.009 0.149 0.038 0.191 0.022 0.034 
 (0.57) (10.32)** (2.91)** (12.15)** (2.15)* (2.36)* 
Dependents -2.785  -1.890  -2.276  
 (8.55)**  (7.84)**  (9.91)**  
Constant -2.822 -11.635 -2.844 -14.979  -9.588 
 (2.54)* (11.22)** (3.27)** (12.89)**  (9.35)** 
Observations: 
censored 
3444  5279    
uncensored 5659  6318    
F Tests: 5-9 0.00(0.994) 3.90(0.048)** 0.07(0.791) 5.72(0.016)* 0.01(0.942) 0.30(0.581) 
            10-13 0.00(0.984) 0.84(3.358) 0.00(0.976) 1.27(0.260) 0.29(0.590) 1.02(0.312) 
            14-16 0.27(0.603) 3.22(0.072)* 0.27(0.604) 4.38(0.036)** 0.86(0.354) 2.69(0.100)* 
            17-19 3.37(0.066)* 22.5(0.000)*** 0.33(0.563) 3.48(0.062)* 3.09(0.078)* 1.76(0.185) 
Note:  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Twenty three district and 2 
ethnicity (Tamil, minority) dummies included in regressions but not reported 
Table 5: F-Tests based on age in levels (rather than age group)  
 1990/91 1995/6 2000/01 
 Engel Curve Double Hurdle Engel 
Curve 
Double Hurdle Engel Curve Double Hurdle 
  Participation 
Equation  
Expenditure 
Equation 
 Participation 
Equation  
Expenditure 
Equation 
 Participation 
Equation  
Expenditure 
Equation 
Age 5 0.64(0.42) 0.17(0.67) 0.11(0.73) 0.79(0.37) 0.06(0.80) 0.11(0.74) 2.80(0.11) 0.21(0.64) 1.95(0.16) 
Age 6 0.06(0.81) 0.00(0.99) 0.04(0.83) 0.20(0.65) 0.00(0.99) 0.25(0.61) 2.58(0.12) 0.00(0.99) 2.21(0.13) 
Age 7 0.61(0.43) 0.00(0.99) 0.76(0.38) 0.02(0.87) 0.00(0.99) 0.02(0.89) 0.00(0.95) 0.00(0.99) 0.04(0.84) 
Age 8 4.43(0.03)* 0.00(0.99) 4.15(0.04)* 6.28(0.01)* 0.00(0.99) 6.70(0.00)** 1.31(0.25) 0.00(0.99) 0.55(0.45) 
Age 9 1.95(0.16) 0.00(0.99) 3.45(0.06)* 2.74(0.09)* 0.00(0.99) 4.45(0.03)* 0.53(0.46) 0.00(0.98) 0.38(0.53) 
Age10 0.00(0.97) 0.00(0.99) 0.01(0.92) 0.86(0.35) 0.02(0.89) 1.18(0.27) 1.10(0.29) 0.02(0.88) 0.37(0.54) 
Age 11 1.70(0.19) 0.00(0.99) 1.35(0.24) 0.73(0.39) 0.00(0.99) 1.16(0.28) 1.23(0.26) 0.00(0.99) 0.59(0.44) 
Age 12 1.85(0.17) 0.01(0.93) 1.58(0.20) 2.21(0.13) 0.00(0.99) 1.39(0.23) 0.15(0.70) 0.00(0.99) 0.15(0.70) 
Age 13 0.05(0.82) 0.21(0.64) 0.00(0.98) 1.26(0.26) 0.00(0.99) 1.20(0.27) 0.36(0.54) 0.00(0.98) 0.94(0.33) 
Age 14 0.02(0.89) 0.27(0.60) 0.22(0.63) 0.11(0.74) 0.00(0.99) 0.10(0.75) 0.26(0.61) 0.00(0.96) 0.11(0.74) 
Age 15 2.10(0.14) 0.00(0.96) 1.26(0.26) 2.13(0.14) 0.08(0.77) 1.23(0.26) 3.11(0.07)* 0.14(0.70) 3.30(0.06)* 
Age 16 2.10(0.14) 0.15(0.73) 2.25(0.12) 9.69(0.00)** 0.17(0.68) 8.49(0.00)** 1.83(0.17) 2.85(0.09) 1.26(0.26) 
Age 17 0.05(0.81) 1.59(0.20) 1.62(0.20) 1.50(0.22) 1.96(0.16) 1.96(0.16) 0.58(0.44) 7.55(0.00)** 0.17(0.68) 
Age 18 10.14(0.00)** 0.64(0.42) 14.54(0.00)** 0.85(0.35) 1.65(0.19) 1.65(0.19) 4.45(0.03)* 0.07(0.78) 3.60(0.05)* 
Age 19 6.03(0.01)* 0.10(0.75) 7.29(0.00)** 1.09(0.29) 0.83(0.36) 0.83(0.36) 0.00(0.99) 0.15(0.69) 0.08(0.71) 
Note:  ** significant at the 1 per cent level, * significant at the 5 percent level           
 
 
 Table 6: Private rates of return to education in Sri Lanka 1995 and 2000* 
 Level of Education 
 Secondary 
(6-10 years of 
schooling) 
Completed O/L 
(11 years of 
schooling) 
Completed A/L 
(13/14 years of 
schooling) 
University 
Graduate 
(15-17 years of 
education) 
1995     
Male- Rural 2.5 3.6 3.5 8.6 
Female-Rural 6.6 8.2 2.4 4.4 
Male-All sectors 2.4 4.2 3.1 7.5 
Female-All Sectors 5.4 9.6 3.2 6.4 
2000     
Male- Rural 1.7 1.1 3.2 2.5 
Female-Rural 4.8 1.6 2.6 4.1 
Male-All sectors 2.4 2.7 3.9 3.9 
Female-All Sectors 6.3 5.8 5.0 8.4 
* Returns for rural sector estimated using results reported in Table 10.1 and 10.2.  Returns for all sectors calculated 
using unreported results.  Calculations based on restricted sample fixed effects estimates.   
 
  
Table 7: Average education levels by occupation category for men and women in 2000. 
Occupation 
Category 
All Sectors-Average education level in 
years 
Rural areas only-Average education level 
in years 
 men women Mean 
compari
son 
Ratio 
women:
men 
men Women Mean 
compari
son 
Ratio 
women:
men 
Legislators, senior 
officials and 
managers 
12.48 12.94 -2.18* 1 : 3.13 12.34 12.48 -0.48 1 : 2.80 
Professionals and 
technicians 
12.27 12.94 -8.32* 1 : 1.20 12.09 12.93 -8.43* 1 : 1.15 
Clerks 11.51 12.30 -7.73* 1 : 1 11.63 12.36 -6.19* 1 : 1.06 
Service workers 
and shop and 
market sales 
workers 
9.83 10.36 -2.21* 1 : 5.64 9.81 10.46 -2.24* 1 : 5.88 
 
Skilled 
agricultural 
workers/fishermen 
8.16 8.13 -0.03 1 : 2.86 8.19 7.05 -0.84 1 : 4.57 
Craft related 8.45 9.36 -7.29* 1 : 2.55 8.4 9.33 -7.04* 1 : 2.36 
Plant and machine 
operators and 
assemblers 
9.16 9.93 -5.04* 1 : 3.09 9.18 9.98 -4.59* 1 : 3.88 
Elementary 
occupation 
7.84 8.69 -6.39* 1 : 2.31 7.88 8.55 -4.09* 1 : 2.94 
Security 
Forces10.76 
10.76 12.14 -1.64 1:24.9 10.65 12 -1.5 1:22.6 
 
 
